While many feminists have criticized the
notion that science can, or should, be objective, Evelyn Fox Keller accepts the
need for a different kind of scientific objectivity (Matthews 1993, p.
207). This summary will trace
Keller’s notion about the dualistic character of Western thought. It will explain the way this dualism is both reflected in scientific ideas about objectivity, and operates in the
creation of the modern, Western individual (Matthews 1993, p.207). I will emphasize Keller’s arguments
about the way the individual’s experience of masculine and feminine has both constructed, and been constructed by, science (Matthews 1993, p.207). I will also outline the way science can
become one possible avenue/discourse/institution for the reconstruction of Western thought, through
the inclusion of the Other.
Increasing representation of women in
scientific fields has not solved the problem of women’s association with nature
and emotion, and they way it has been defined in opposition to a rational and detached male (Keller 1987,
p.80). As Keller (1997, p. 80)
points out, 31 percent of the scientific workforce in America was occupied by
women in 1986. Nevertheless she
argues that women’s nature is still seen as alien to science and there is still
the assumption that their nature encourages women to do a different kind of
science (Keller 1989, p. 80).
Whilst it is true that women in Asia, for example, are generally more involved in the health and behavioural sciences, their lack of participation in
the physical sciences cannot be explained by biological essentialist
assumptions about women’s nature (Ng Choon Sim 1994, p.284).
Feminists have made several responses to
the underlying ideas in science.
Bleier (1991, p.251) has criticized the idea that biology
determines difference, that is, the unequal relationship between the
sexes. The biological determinist
approach ignores both the sex/gender distinction and a cross-cultural
perspective that accounts for difference between men and women of a variety of
races and class positions (Keller 1987, p. 81). Furthermore, scientists like Keller (1987, p.81) have begun
to question both the assumptions science makes about a single truth, and the notion
that the laws of nature are universal.
Keller’s lived experiences with motherhood, feminism and psychoanalysis
caused her to reevaluate the usefulness of traditional scientific accounts of
objectivity and truth.
Keller (1987, p.78) asserts that the
history of Western thought has consciously and unconsciously been based on the
idea that the mind and the body are split. Knowledge and objectivity have developed around the notion
that the subject (or the knower) must distance themselves from all that is
feminine. Keller parallels the
construction of objectivity in science with a psychoanalytic account of the
development of the ‘masculine self’.
Her argument relies strongly on the notion that the creation of an
individual masculine identity requires separation from, and rejection of, the Other
(Matthews 1993, p.208-211).
Matthews agues that smaller differences between observer and observed
exist both in African societies and in the behaviour/minds/actions of Western
women. Many feminists claim that a
reintegration of self/other and subject/object is necessary, if inequalities between
men and women are to be further deconstructed (Matthews 1993, p.211).
Whether or not the origin of the dualism in
Western science is seen to emerge out of the male’s construction of his own
identity, it is evident that Western science is historically (and continues to
be) organized around dualisms such as mind/body and reason/emotion. It can be argued that dualism operating within
both science and ‘selfhood’ reinforce one another, and combine to justify the
self’s relationship to the Other.
Keller (1987, p.80) argues that the embeddedness of cultural ideas about
the way men and women are has shaped science, and that, simultaneously, the authority of science
has shaped cultural ideas about men and women (Keller 1987, p. 80).
Matthews (1993, p. 208) discusses several
feminist responses to the notion of scientific objectivity. She rejects the pessimistic
notion of some relativist feminists, that objectivity is impossible to achieve. Matthews praises integrationist feminists,
such as Keller, for their capacity to acknowledge a new way of thinking rationally and 'doing' science. Keller argues for an objectivity that uses a less dualistic
relationship of subject to object (Matthews 1993, p.211). McClintock (1995, p.214) expands upon the notion of the
relationship of the observer to the observed, when she asserts that all
objects have a communicative capacity.
In this notion, an object
presents its possibilities to human beings. This way of thinking is in contrast with both, ideas about
knowledge in Western thought, and the general scientific notion that the human
subject autonomously creates and objectively knows (Matthews 1993, p.
213). Keller’s account of
objectivity also differs from traditional science, in that it recognizes that knowing
does involve subjectivity (internal experience), that is; feelings, values,
emotions and intuition (Matthews 1993, p. 224).
Pluralist feminists have responded to the
notion of objectivity by arguing that there are no real feminine or masculine characteristics, and no ‘essentialised’
identities (Matthews 1993, p.214).
By acknowledging the claims of all individuals, Matthews (1993, p. 220)
argues that pluralism cannot prove feminism is better than male supremacy. She argues that pluralism unrealistically works with the notion that
knowledges are mutually enriching.
Although pluralism has a very restrictive understanding of power and knowledge,
pluralist accounts are important in that they recognize that the position of
women is occupied by class and race, as well as gender (Matthews 1993, p. 222).
Whilst it may seem that integrationists are
arguing that women are essentially more relational in construction of their
individual psychology, Matthews (1993, p. 213) defends the integrationist
position by stating that Keller is not intending to separate male and female
perspectives, or essentialise them. Bleier sums up Matthew’s view of Keller:
“One may indeed value the characteristics
in our Western societies that are associated with femaleness – and, indeed,
need to celebrate them, since they seem to be the only force standing in the
way of our society’s plunge into self-destruction – but we need not justify
them as natural, biological or innate” (Bleier 1991, p. 254).
Keller and Bleier both recognize that males
and females do not necessarily fit into the masculine or feminine
correspondences in which they are generally associated. Nevertheless, they understand that
feminists have effectively used these correspondences to further the value
accorded to women.
New definitions of objectivity may provide
the basis for theoretical developments and alternative possibilities for the
individual, in the construction of his or her identity. Keller is recognizing that science is
one area in which the oppositional nature of categories such as male/female,
mind/body, culture/nature can be transformed, and in effect, influence the
oppositional construction of Western thought (Matthews 1993, p.220). Nevertheless, theorists must remember
that such oppositions are unique to Western culture, and an understanding of
them may not provide an understanding of the way inequality was constructed in
pre-capitalist Western and non-Western societies.
In conclusion, Keller argues that bringing
together characteristics that are generally unassociated; rationality/emotion
and mind/body would affect science positively. Perhaps then, technology and science will include
perspectives about knowing that are not as destructive to the Other, and indeed, to nature. Keller’s assertions provide the basis
for an alternative objectivity that is more friendly to the needs and thoughts
of women. Perhaps such a move in
scientific thought could encourage the individual to manifest itself more in
relation to, and not at the expense of, the Other (Matthews 1993, p. 213).
Otherness
Identity
Essentialism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essentialism
Pluralism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluralism_(philosophy)
Revolutionary Integrationism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_integrationism
Revolutionary Integrationism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_integrationism
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